

Citizen participation in crime prevention – capturing practice knowledge through the 5Is framework

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Introduction¹

The field of practical crime prevention and community safety is complex. Knowledge of how to undertake the practice well, and how to replicate 'success stories' in new contexts, is vital. But it's challenging to obtain, organise and apply that knowledge (Tilley 1993; Ekblom 2002, 2005, 2011). We can identify several distinct kinds of knowledge relevant to crime prevention² practice (Ekblom 2002, 2011):

- *Know crime* – definitions of criminal offences
- *Know-about crime problems* – their patterns, causes, offenders, harmful consequences
- *Know-what works* to reduce crime, in what context, by what causal mechanisms
- *Know-how to put into practice* – how to undertake the 'preventive process' (Ekblom 1988)
- *Know-when to act* – relative to other activities ongoing or planned for the neighbourhood or city
- *Know-where to distribute resources* – in relation to need, demand etc
- *Know-why* – symbolism, values, politics, ethics – if neglected, these factors can wreck a project
- *Know-who to involve and how* – mobilising and working in partnership with other individuals, groups, organisations and communities

Knowing who to involve and how in crime prevention is arguably the most difficult and complex kind of knowledge to gather and apply. In effect we are here talking about the human condition – how individuals, groups and organisations work, or fail to work, together in society – and how to change people's behaviour in line with societal or government goals (e.g. see Home Office 2006). Much of the pervasive implementation failure of crime prevention programmes can be attributed to human involvement issues. These are the subject of this chapter.

The chapter continues by noting that much crime prevention is delivered by third parties – citizens and organisations – rather than professional crime preventers. Given this, our tools for thinking, communicating and acting through and with such parties should be of good

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² Hereafter, for brevity, 'crime prevention' includes community safety.

quality – but unfortunately they are not. Some arguably better tools are suggested – the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity and the 5Is framework. These are introduced and finally, further elaborated in action in a case study of ‘Involvement failure’. The case study describes an attempt to develop and trial a table-clip to prevent bag theft in bars. Although successful on the product design side, the study encountered such a range of difficulties of collaboration with the various stakeholders at every level that the project was overwhelmed, despite such risks being anticipated and determined attempts being made to control them. The final such difficulty encountered was the world economic crisis of 2008, which brought the planned impact evaluation to a halt. This notwithstanding, the experience provided rich material for learning for both implementing crime prevention through the actions of citizens and other third parties in the real world, and for the design of ‘resilient evaluations’.

Who delivers crime prevention?

Some crime prevention interventions are *directly* delivered by professional preventers working in the police service (such as patrols or law enforcement), probation (supervision and support of offenders), local government (such as improving street lighting) or youth services (such as summer entertainment programmes or youth centres). However, the majority of preventive effort is delivered *indirectly* by ‘civil’ organisations and individuals often in their daily routines of work, travel, domestic activity, family life and leisure. Here, the role of the professionals is mostly to mobilise or work in partnership with the civil world. (See also the concept of ‘third party policing’ – Mazerolle and Ransley 2006.) And even direct implementation may require professional partnerships to share responsibility for addressing problems, and to span divisions of labour to bring together complementary perspectives and resources (Ekblom 2004).

Inadequate tools for thinking, communicating and acting

Given that so much crime prevention is delivered through third parties, it’s unfortunate that the key dimension of ‘know-who’ for practice, delivery and policy has been understated, underdeveloped and under-structured. Consider these ‘methods’ – the kind we would expect to see brought together on a typical administrative ‘shopping list’ of preventive actions:

- Police on patrol
- Crime prevention publicity campaign – ‘lock it or lose it’
- Installation of security clips in bars to prevent theft of customers’ bags
- Outreach activities aimed at bringing young people on streets into youth centres
- Communities That Care (Crow et al. 2004)
- Neighbourhood Watch

These may look superficially equivalent but in fact all involve professionals, citizens and organisations participating in very different ways. The limitations of our ability to describe and distinguish such forms of involvement affect how well we can think, communicate and act in the preventive domain.

One attempt to structure this involvement has emerged within the Problem-Oriented Policing approach – which explicitly recognises the need to identify and mobilise key stakeholders when dealing with persistent crime and disorder problems. The Crime Triangle (Offender, Place, Target/Victim) briefly summarises some of the main causes of criminal events and simultaneously indicates some fundamental approaches to prevention. In more recent formulations the inner triangle of *causes* is surrounded by an outer triangle of people or organisations who can *influence* those causes – thus ‘handlers’ influence (potential) offenders, ‘guardians’ targets and ‘managers’ places. Sampson et al. (2010) have more recently introduced the concept of ‘super controllers’ – the people or organisations that in turn influence the immediate handlers, guardians and managers. The Crime Triangle as a framework for cause and intervention is usually accompanied by the SARA model of the preventive process – Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment (e.g. Clarke and Eck 2003).

Elsewhere (e.g. Ekblom 2005, 2006, 2011) I have criticised this twin formulation as ‘useful but limited’ in handling the messy complexity of crime prevention practice on the ground. There is insufficient detail beyond the first level of slogans; quite distinct processes are lumped together under ‘Response’, for example; and the underlying theories (such as routine activity theory and rational choice theory) are insufficiently integrated conceptually and terminologically. Moreover, for practitioners and researchers considering making offender-oriented interventions, the Crime Triangle and SARA are explicitly ‘not interested’. I have developed an alternative suite that attempts to be more sophisticated, flexible and comprehensive. This includes the *Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity* (Ekblom 2010, 2011,) an integrated model covering 11 causes of criminal events and counterpart families of intervention aimed at interrupting, weakening or diverting those causes; and the *5Is framework* for the model of the preventive process. Both CCO and 5Is have a structured place for all the tiers of human influence covered by the Crime Triangle and SARA respectively.

Better tools?

Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO)

The causes of criminal events identified by CCO comprise a juxtaposition of ‘things’ (material target of crime, enclosure, environment) and ‘people’ (offenders, preventers and promoters). Offenders are covered in much more detail than by the Crime Triangle. Preventers and promoters are roles that people play, that respectively make crime *less* or *more* likely to occur – as such they are of central relevance to the issue of citizen participation in crime prevention.

Preventers can range from dedicated police patrols, to parents controlling their wayward children, to drivers locking their car securely... to designers of secure products and local governments creating entertainment facilities for young people. The preventer concept covers all tiers of involvement including those people acting within the immediate crime situation, and those acting at one level removed (as with ‘super-controllers’); but CCO focuses on the former.

Promoters could be the entirely innocent person who provides cover for a robbery by parking their car in the wrong place at the wrong time; the careless person who pushes

pizza advertisements through people's front door letter boxes leaving the end hanging out, which in fact advertises that here is a house with nobody at home; the careless motor manufacturer who designs and sells a car which is easy to break into; the shady electronics dealer who re-chips stolen mobile phones; or the criminal fence who buys them from the thief. Preventive interventions often work by adding or mobilising preventers, or by stopping people acting as promoters – better still, converting them to preventers (e.g. from 'person often leaves door unlocked' to 'routinely locks door').

The 5Is framework

5Is (Eckblom 2011) comprises five task streams:

- *Intelligence* Gathering and analysing information and knowledge on crime, its nature, causes and harmful consequences. The purpose is to inform the specification of crime prevention and community safety aims and priorities to be Implemented; the planning and design of the preventive Intervention/s; and the other tasks that follow.
- *Intervention* Designing and planning practical *methods* to realise particular intervention *principles*. These all aim to block, divert or weaken the causes, and attend to risk and protective factors, of *future* criminal events and careers or of wider community safety problems – so the probability of their occurrence, and the harm they cause, is reduced.
- *Implementation* The wider set of practical and managerial tasks required to *realise the plans and designs* for methods of Intervention, and of the other main tasks of the preventive process. Implementation operates at levels ranging from the specific intervention *methods* themselves, to *projects and services* applying sets of methods, to *processes* like recruitment, training or management of 'delivery units' such as a youth centre or an ad hoc project team.
- *Involvement* Tasks specifically focusing on getting *other people and/or agencies* to understand, accept, and undertake, share or support the tasks, roles and responsibilities of implementing preventive interventions; or to otherwise support such tasks by alleviating constraints, boosting enablers and establishing a receptive climate. Involvement and Implementation should not be viewed as 'first one step, then the other', but as two intertwined streams – the one *people-focused*, the other *task-focused*.
- *Impact* Gathering and presenting evidence of effectiveness and related evaluative information on the outcomes of the preventive action; also covers process evaluation.

5Is is in many respects a second-generation SARA, and its main task streams map readily onto the earlier framework. The most significant difference for present purposes is that the amorphous 'Response' stage of SARA is divided, in 5Is, into the three analytically distinct task streams of Intervention, Implementation and Involvement.

Involvement as just defined connects with the 'preventer and promoter' concepts of CCO. As said, CCO focuses by convention on those people acting (or failing to act) in the immediate crime situation rather than several steps of cause and effect/social influence away, but Involvement covers the full range. (In POP terms it covers 'super-controllers'

rather than merely ‘guardians, handlers and place managers’ – but I regard these heuristic terms and distinctions as rather inflexible because, for example, even place managers may have ‘place-manager-managers’ on site).

Involvement is the obvious focus for describing, understanding and influencing citizen participation in crime prevention, but in fact, the three ‘Response’ concepts together enable a much more complete articulation of what is going on. Let’s re-examine the ‘shopping list’ set out above:

- Police on patrol – *professionals Implement the Intervention themselves*
- Crime prevention publicity campaign – *professionals Involve public, who then Implement the Intervention themselves (they buy, fit and operate window locks)*
- Installation of security clips in bars to prevent theft of customers’ bags – *designers create Intervention, and Involve others Implementing it: bar managers (installation), customers (usage)*
- Outreach activities to young people on streets – *youth workers Involve (recruit) young people to join in the activities at a youth centre, co-Implementing their own treatment (Intervention)*
- Communities That Care – *CTC professionals mobilise/form partnership with local civil professionals, and together both mobilise citizens and local organisations to Implement Interventions drawn from a ‘what works’ menu*
- Neighbourhood Watch – *citizens collectively mobilise themselves, to work in partnership with police, to Implement Interventions centring on surveillance*

We can encapsulate the above examples, and in fact articulate the widest range of crime prevention activity in a structured way, by saying that the professionals *Involve* other parties in *Implementing* the *Intervention* or otherwise supporting it.

The reality is even messier than these brief descriptions allow, of course, as will become apparent. The case study that follows illustrates just how messy and complicated. It also shows how further concepts are needed to articulate the practice issues that arise, in order to aid thinking, communication and sharing of knowledge. Accordingly, as the case study unfolds, we go into progressively greater detail on the process of Involvement.

A case of Involvement failure – the Grippa clip evaluation

The issue of failure in crime prevention

Failure is, unfortunately, a pervasive phenomenon in evaluations of crime prevention initiatives (see Ekblom 2011 for a review). Rosenbaum (1986), discussing the problem in evaluations of community crime prevention programmes, did us the necessary but uncomfortable service of distinguishing between three kinds:

- *Theory failure* (where the fundamental idea behind the intervention was wrong);
- *Implementation or programme failure* (where the theory may have been right but the realisation was weak); and
- *Measurement or evaluation failure* (where the intervention may have worked but the evaluation lacked the power to test it).

Learning from failure is obviously an important activity for practitioners, programme managers and theorists alike. Rosenbaum's concepts are a helpful start in this respect, but aren't detailed enough to help evaluators investigate, articulate and transfer useful knowledge to reduce the chances of failure in future initiatives. Bowers and Johnson (2006) usefully identify a range of more detailed failure risks in reviewing implementation issues. They organise them in terms of these headings: lack of experience, theory failure, under-resourcing, high staff turnover, no champion, lack of infrastructure, lack of exit strategy, red tape, slow implementation and displacement. They cross-classify these risks against operational features of preventive schemes: type of scheme, nature of targets, who is implementing (with obvious connections to Involvement) and how intense the scheme is. Finally, they produce a table which summarises empirical experience for each of the 40 combinations. But imposing even more structure can take this approach still further.

5Is offers just such a structure. As a detailed process model for crime prevention (and a ready-made framework for process evaluation) we can use 5Is to ask, of some wholly or partially failed project or programme, where the failure in question happened. Was it at the stage of Intelligence (e.g. failure to obtain valid crime statistics or to analyse them appropriately)? Intervention (e.g. failure to apply the right theoretical approach to the problem and context, or to select a sufficiently evidence-based method)? Implementation (e.g. failure to install sufficiently robust window locks on houses)? Involvement (as in the illustration that follows)? Or Impact (e.g. insufficient numbers of observations or too short a time period to give sufficient statistical power in an impact evaluation)? Did the failure reside in just one of these tasks, or in how the whole set was brought together?

Of course, 5Is goes into more detail under each of these tasks and allows a correspondingly finer analysis of what went wrong, and hence what needs to be put right next time. Such finer analysis can also pick up elements of what worked *well* even in the context of a wider failure, rather like a sieve filtering ore from base rock (an analogy similar to Pawson's 2006 use of 'gold nuggets'). For example, a burglary project may have had a badly-designed and implemented intervention, but the method of mobilising participants was excellent and innovative and worth salvaging for wider application, while the rest can be discarded or used as an example of what to avoid.

CCO can help here too. For example it can enable our investigation of Intelligence failure to systematically consider which *causes* of crime were misdiagnosed and why. Within Intervention failure it can guide consideration of a failure to apply the right *theory*. And within Implementation failure it can help us be systematic about which *causal mechanisms* (such as deterrence or discouragement) failed to be triggered (Pawson and Tilley 1997; Ekblom 2002, 2011).

The case study

This brings us to the case study of Involvement failure.

If you visit a public bar, cafe or library your bag, if you have one, is at risk of being stolen. Results from the British Crime Survey suggest that people who visit cafes and bars three or more times a week are at more than twice the risk of theft that those who do not (Kershaw, Nicholas and Walker 2008). Diverse attempts have been made to prevent this category of crime but the ones of interest here centre on the design of products – furniture and fittings

– to help customers in such places to protect their property. Various items have been designed and tested at the Design Against Crime Research Centre (DACRC). One is the Stop Thief chair (www.stopthiefchair.com), which has two notches on the front of the seat to allow people to hang their bag securely behind their knees. Another – the subject of this case study – is the Grippa Clip (www.grippaclip.com) – a hinged loop fixed under the table edge for people to hang their bags on. The clip is easy for the legitimate user to operate but difficult for the thief to remove or steal from the bag because of the obvious, intentional hand/arm movements. The hanging bag moreover remains close to the owner’s body space and tactile/visual awareness zone. In terms of causal mechanisms, the Grippa clip sought to increase the effort and risk on the part of offenders attempting to unhook bags, and simultaneously empower preventers (the bag owners); in doing so to reduce opportunities for bag theft.

DACRC and UCL Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science collaborated on what was intended to be a thorough design process informed by research and theory, followed by a large-scale and rigorous impact evaluation of the clips on crime. The study was designed in full awareness of the risks of failure (Ekblom and Sidebottom 2007) – the research team was not naive to these issues (all investigators had experienced and in some cases written on implementation failure). Indeed, following a collaboration with a previous company on bar security (Smith et al. 2006) we systematically undertook risk analyses. We also developed a spreadsheet application (CRITIC – Bowers et al. 2010 and see www.grippaclip.com/publications/academic-papers/critics-link-to-spreadsheet-calculator/) to resolve issues of statistical power on the one hand, and the scale and costs of affordable prototype manufacture on the other. Without being too immodest, the clip design was good, the evaluation design was good, but the people and organisations side, initially promising, let us down, despite receiving much close attention. This is how it happened.

1. Providing a reliable impact evaluation of the Grippa Clips required collaboration with a series of pubs/bars in which to implement the clips and monitor their usage. Following negotiations at high level the top management of one major UK chain of bars agreed to let us trial the clips and (with management board approval) to contribute financially to their production. Anticipating risk, the research team immediately attempted to set up a contractual agreement with the company, though legal negotiations became extremely protracted and were never completed.
2. Meetings were held to brief the local managers of around 30 London bars about the project and to secure their understanding and collaboration, get their feedback on the problem of bag theft and document current preventive measures in place. These meetings were very positive, constructive and enthusiastic. In both top and local management meetings, we were careful to emphasise our sensitivity to issues of improving security *without* harming the reputation of individual bars or of the bar company, as safe places for customers to visit.
3. We took the evolving clip designs through several iterations of test and improvement. We first of all trialled them on paper and computer, then as plastic prototypes (3D printing) in workshop ‘critique’ sessions with bar staff and police. Here, we were attempting to inject an element of ‘co-design’ (Burns et al. 2006) into the process, particularly with the various stakeholder groups. Police design advisors who attended were very helpful, but somehow the input from the bar managers was surprisingly limited and disappointing.

4. We then installed prototype clips in two bars where customer opinion was assessed and taken into account. This comprised a series of site visits where observations were made and a standardised questionnaire was given out to both clip users and non-users to gain information concerning their perceptions and experiences of using the clips.
5. The last step was to have been to roll out the finalised clips in the full-scale evaluation. The plan was to have clips deployed in 13 trial bars for comparison with 14 carefully-matched controls using police crime figures, staff-captured victim reports and behavioural observations of bag security. Unfortunately we never got this far. Over two years into the project, with the order for 2000 of the production version of the clips finalised and soon to go into the trial bars, the company suddenly broke off negotiations on the contract (which had continued to drag on) and stated that it no longer wished to continue with the collaboration – though it did, very graciously, wish us well. This was at the peak of the global financial crisis and we can only surmise that there was some connection, the company deciding to put a halt on anything which comprised ‘non-core business’. We did go back to head office to offer to release them from their moral commitment to the financial input for production costs provided they still allowed us access to the sites in which to install the clips...but this chain was not for turning. And as it turned out, the company did not seem to get into any serious financial difficulty.

We can go over some of these events in more diagnostic detail, using additional concepts of Involvement in particular to draw out and articulate what was going on, to provide both local feedback and generic, transferrable, lessons.

The task of Involvement is further differentiated, within 5Is, into partnership, mobilisation and climate setting.³

- *Partnership* is about sharing responsibility and risk, and pooling resources, for achieving mutual goals (Ekblom 2004, 2011).
- *Mobilisation* is less symmetrical and covers those common occasions when professional preventers (in police or local government, say) invite, persuade or sometimes order others to take positive preventive action or to desist from activities which promote crime.
- *Climate-setting* is a more diffuse activity comprising several tasks: explaining or justifying actions; shifting underlying assumptions (for example about responsibility for a crime problem); changing expectations about who can and should be doing something about the crime problem in question; aligning stakeholders and dutyholders to support one another’s goals and understand their constraints; and healing hostile or suspicious relationships between, say, communities and the police which are blocking specific collaborations to prevent crime.

The next section discusses each in turn in the context of the Grippa clip project.

Partnership

³ Other Involvement processes – some of which are more relevant to ‘social’ or ‘community’ action, include Outreach, Consultation, Demand, Recruitment, Accountability and Cohesion. See Ekblom (2011) and <http://5isframework.wordpress.com>.

Our relations with the bar company constituted, at top level, what we initially believed to be a *partnership*. This under-wrote our usual process of co-designing with the client. Ultimately the partnership failed to deliver and indeed collapsed. In fact, events revealed that it was illusory, based perhaps on differing expectations and unequal commitment and (despite our efforts with the contract) never formalised.

A few months into the project, the company experienced significant sales reductions (possibly connected with a nationwide non-smoking initiative which came into effect in England in July 2007). Many of the top managers were 'let go' and project liaison was passed to more junior, regional management – a lack of *commitment* and a high-level *champion*. Regional managers, although enthusiastic and committed, didn't have the 'clout' (influence) within the company to make things happen, a lack of *capability*. Moreover, they were moved around geographically rather frequently so *continuity* was both difficult to maintain and labour-intensive. But worse was to befall our relationship as the global financial crisis struck, as discussed under 'climate-setting' below.

Mobilisation

What happened with *local* bar managers can best be described under *mobilisation* – in fact what should have been a *joint* mobilisation of bar managers by researchers and company in partnership. Bar managers were, like their regional supervisors, moved round between venues, again giving problems of *continuity*. This meant our original, efficient and effective group briefing had to be supplemented by repeated ad hoc briefings of new bar managers encountered whilst undertaking observation and data collection. (This was partly an unfortunate side-effect of attempting to boost the power of the impact evaluation by expanding the numbers of bars, illustrating a trade-off between avoiding Involvement failure on the one hand, and Impact evaluation/measurement failure on the other – see Bowers et al. 2009.) Moreover our impression was of inefficient *communication* between regional managers and bar managers. And of course the bartender job throughout the world is notorious for rapid employee turnover.

As said, we piloted our near-final prototype clips in two London bars. Here, we found that the public, when interviewed, liked the designs and the concept. But they didn't actually *use* them – a failure, again, of *mobilisation*. Once again, we can 'zoom in' to the concept of mobilisation to unpick what was going on. The mobilisation process can be characterised by the acronym CLAIMED (Ekblom 2011):

- **C**larify crime prevention roles/ tasks that need to be done
- **L**ocate appropriate preventive agents – individuals or organisations
- **A**lert them that they may be causing crime (as promoters) and/or could help prevent it
- **I**nform them about crime problem, its causes and consequences
- **M**otivate them to act as preventers
- **E**mpower them – increase their capacity by briefing, training or equipment
- **D**irect them – via orders, objectives or standards

The roles in question concerned *acting as preventers of theft of bags in bars*. Specific tasks required of these roles, and the relevant agents, included *installing* the clips (bar company

and local managers); actually *using* them to protect bags (customers transformed from inadvertent crime *promoters* to *preventers*); and *encouraging use* of the clips (bar staff).

Installation was not a problem, since the research team undertook this for the pilot, and the bar managers were Directed to accept them by regional managers, but in terms of Information, Motivation and Empowerment the clips were in any case designed to be obvious and easy to fix and to avoid causing damage to the tables they were fixed to.

Use did fail however. Over several months of observation very few of the clips indeed were seen to be employed by customers to secure their bags. What caused this? There seemed to be a problem with Alerting and Informing customers on the existence of the clips and what they were for; and Empowering them in terms of making clear how they were to be used.

We had sought to address this by designing the clips to be visible, in two ways. They were mounted at the edge of the table (earlier police-designed 'Chelsea clips' were hidden beneath the table at some distance from the edge, and site visits had indicated they were rarely used). We also opted for a style that could be described as 'bling not blend', giving the clips a bright red coating rather than a plain brass finish that would more closely fit the bar decor.

We also designed some posters (www.grippaclip.com/design-outputs-2/communications-graphics/) but the bar company confined these to the toilets for fear of impacting on the bars' image of safety. In response to the non-use of the clips, and the restriction on posters, we also designed cardboard 'hangers' showing the clips in use – these were intended to dangle from the clips and catch the customers' attention more directly. With all these communications designs we took pains to ensure a proper balance of mobilising the customers without demotivating the company and managers by scaring the customers off. Indeed, in our 'communications designs' we used the concept of 'caring' more than that of overt security.

There was also an issue of Motivation. Customers interviewed generally approved of the concept and liked the designs; but even when aware, many did not use them. Hints emerged about some people being worried they would forget their bags, or that an overt concern with security was 'uncool' amongst one's friends. Moreover,, being relaxed is often part of the culture of bars and cafes which is why people often don't prioritise security. We also formed the impression that there was overall some kind of '*behavioural change inertia*'. Further possible causes of the lack of self-protection – the discrepancy between knowing that bags were at high risk on the floors of bars and doing something about it – were explored by research team members Sidebottom and Bowers (2010). Hypotheses included alcohol-induced confusion, lack of definitive knowledge of the safest places to stow a bag, limited placement options (addressed by the installation of the clips) and the well-established psychological principle known as the *optimistic bias* (Weinstein 1980): the tendency to underestimate personal risk – 'it will never happen to me.'

Encouraging use was ideally the responsibility of bar management and bartenders. A parallel trial in Barcelona (http://issuu.com/designagainstcrime/docs/6_grippa_bcn_english_1) showed bartenders

willing and able to prompt customers to use the clips, gently indicating the crime risk to which they were exposed, and how to use the clips to protect their property. Usage was correspondingly greater in the two Spanish bars.

Unfortunately the staff in the London bars did act like their Barcelona counterparts. Causes were not entirely clear but seemed to include *Motivation* issues. Busy bar staff on low pay and likely to move on in a few weeks or months were perhaps not committed to this extra work; in fact, the hangers, which kept being taken off the clips and dropped on the floor by customers, were seen as a positive nuisance and were not replenished. (One could say this was a design flaw. Being easily removable meant customers took the hangers off, had a look but then didn't put them back on and hence pretty soon they were strewn all over the floor. Our eventual design solution to this was to put a bag silhouette on the Grippa clips themselves, simultaneously avoiding the litter problem and bypassing reluctant bar staff.)

Nor were the bar staff adequately *Alerted, Informed and Directed* by local managers (who were not always present) and regional managers. Communication of purpose and necessary action, and supervision within the company, seemed intermittent on this aspect at least. *Empowerment* was also a problem, in that some bar staff had limited use of English, hindering their communication with customers.

Climate-setting

Where does *climate-setting* fit into the picture? Obviously, our belief that we had established a satisfactory climate of understanding and expectation with the top level of the bar company, leading moreover to a partnership, was illusory. The company itself had originally approached *us* to address theft problems at one of their London bars, but the accepting climate did not appear to have durably and thoroughly permeated the whole of the senior management (nor the legal department protractedly working on the contract).

A more cynical view comes from consideration of the company's own operating environment. The company's approach to us had been made at a time of increasing bag theft from bars more generally, and the company itself had been under considerable expectation and pressure from the Metropolitan Police to do something about the problem – to turn from apparent inadvertent crime promoter to active, responsible preventer. Becoming a partner in our research project was perhaps part of that 'something'. London theft rates declined in subsequent years (although a satisfactory explanation was never determined) and the police pressure was directed against other issues and venues. The motivation to collaborate on this project faded away. The removal of the outside pressures meant that the bar company felt free to change direction. What we had believed was a more fundamental joint interest had in fact been no more than two bodies moving in parallel under very different, but temporarily coincident, forces. What we had believed to be *acceptance* of the value of the Grippa clip initiative had been revealed merely to be *compliance* with momentary influences (e.g. Manstead and Hewstone 1996).


The climate of security *within* the bar, co-created by customers, staff and management, was also limited. There seemed to be few expectations by customers that staff should be taking an interest in their security. Nor did bar staff, in their turn, feel that alerting customers to the risks of placing bags in dangerous places was their job (of course that assumes that they

knew which places/positions were or were not risky), or that they had any incentives or support from their seniors to go beyond the call of duty, as it were, and become concerned about theft. There were further complications: the bar staff sometimes expressed the worry that customers would respond negatively if someone pointed out the errors of their bag placement behaviour. Interestingly, the bartender-client relationship in the two bars where clips were trialled in Barcelona appeared to be very different to London. In the former, they can sometimes be said almost to ‘perform’ to customers (quite possibly for tips) – and are likely to be more integrated among them because of the table service. London as we know often lacks in terms of a good service culture, indicating, as ever, the importance of context.

Integration

So far the approach adopted here has been analytic, dissecting out the various differing aspects of Involvement and focusing on the individual roles played by people and organisations in crime prevention. But we should also consider the whole *system* of influence and activity (or inactivity). Certainly from the point of view of attempting to run an experiment, here was a system where any assignment of responsibility and communication about security issues was severely fragmented. The absence of a ‘security thread’ running through the whole system and subject to consistent management at all levels meant that, while we had considerable influence over aspects of Intelligence, Intervention and Impact evaluation in this study, we lacked it in Involvement of several key players and Implementation of the tasks and roles we had hoped they would undertake.

Hopefully this case study has demonstrated how we can use the 5Is framework and CCO to articulate and explain this apparently ad-hoc and diverse collection of mishaps and failures in the Involvement of individuals and organisations in crime prevention. The diagram below shows how the 5Is concepts used above relate to one another, in progressively more detailed ways.



Practical lessons – anticipating, avoiding and addressing Involvement failure

Explanation of Involvement failure, of course, would be of little use if it did not also feed into lessons for both anticipating, avoiding and addressing that failure. Happily, the same tools that diagnose failure can also be used in risk analysis and planning.

On anticipation, risk can be divided into possibility (the undesired events), probability and harm. At the very least, we now have a more detailed and systematic way of identifying generic possibilities of Involvement failure, which can be translated to cover the specific circumstances of the preventive actions that are being planned or are already in operation. An example of this approach in use during the Grippa project was presented by (Ekblom and Sidebottom 2007). Adapting Bowers and Johnson's (2006) approach to classifying and bringing together empirical experience of failures, described above, can build a body of knowledge for anticipating and addressing such risk factors. Combined with a systematic structure like 5Is this could prove very powerful.

On probability and harm, we can reduce the former and prepare for or mitigate the latter by deliberately accumulating articulated practical experience of Involvement failure and the conditions under which it does and doesn't occur. Following Pawson (2006; see also Ekblom 2011) we can attempt to convert this experience into 'middle-range theory' of Involvement processes, and test this in a programme of deliberate experimental *manipulations* of 'Involvement contexts' rather than just research based on interviews and retrospective speculation.

Interestingly, in this last connection DACRC have (at the time of writing) installed Grippa clips (and Stop Thief Chairs – www.stopthiefchair.com) in a busy venue of a major cafe chain and here the Grippas are being used quite readily – perhaps even more so than in the Barcelona bars where they were also tested. Here, then, is a case of *Involvement success*.

But the mere fact of success, though encouraging, is not enough. We need to know what lies behind that success, in a generative way, so we can replicate it in other contexts. What are the physical, cultural, social, organisational and environmental causes underlying the differences in Involvement? What theories do they relate to? How can they be deliberately and acceptably switched on and switched off, as appropriate? How do we get to understand the whole system of use, not just the individual products, procedures and communications in isolation? Certainly the company involved in this new trial is keen to emphasise the commitment of its floor staff to both customers and to the company itself.

More strategically, Cherney (2008) envisages development of a wider 'support delivery system' for crime prevention (organised in terms of 10 Cs!). Another strategic answer may be to design and plan evaluations to maximise *resilience* (a theme I have long pursued – Ekblom 1990, Ekblom and Pease 1995, Ekblom et al., 1997). However, resilience in evaluation can be costly. For example, we considered building redundancy of Involvement into our project by working with more than one company in parallel, and in fact began exploratory negotiations with another. We abandoned this plan however because for one thing, it became difficult to bring the other possible partners to a timely decision, and for another we had by then discovered just how much work was involved in collaborating with one single company and its set of bars.

Another resilience strategy to consider is try to go for shorter, modular projects, where we can 'strike while the iron is hot' and get collaborating companies to act before significant random events derail plans, external pressures upon them to collaborate diminish, and internal changes have time to occur. However, this may conflict with the need to build up

adequate research knowledge. The very recent trial of Grippa clips and Stop Thief chairs at a single venue with pre-designed products (as described above) is an instance of this modular approach. However, it does mean the research phase may not so closely relate to and inform the trial phase.

But no matter how we try to build and apply experience and exert influence, involvement will ever remain a complex and risky business. Pawson (2006) takes the view that social interventions always involve the injection of new complexity into existing complex systems. I view these issues in terms of *complex adaptive systems* (Eklom 2011) with the interventions prone to 'system failure' (Chapman 2004). Love (2009) goes further and argues that in crime prevention situations where there are two or more feedback loops the characteristics of successful interventions will probably display counter-intuitive relationships. Humans will almost inevitably get things wrong, unless they are aided by sophisticated system models, preferably dynamic and computerised ones.

Underlying many of the difficulties we experienced in this attempted experiment is the issue of motivation and responsibility, which connects with matters of 'ownership' of problems, governance and even politics. It also connects with climate-setting expectations and norms at the level of national cultures. People in the UK rush to sue the local council when they trip over a loose paving stone – but why don't they think a bar is at least *partly* responsible for their bag going missing when they are on the premises? Experience has shown on car security, and mobile phone security, for example, that even with major 'crime attractors' (Brantingham and Brantingham 2008), significant leverage has to be applied both by police and politically to get people and organisations to change attitudes, expectations and behaviour (e.g. Laycock 2004), including naming and shaming and awakening consumer pressures.

In the final analysis, commitment, communication and continuity of third parties in crime prevention, simply cannot be guaranteed. This is especially true in a changing world with financial crises, local ups and downs of business partners and limited leverage to influence the motivation of people and organisations that one wants to mobilise or engage in partnership. Those damned humans and their complex adaptive systems! But at least we have a start in getting to grips with the issues of citizen participation and related processes, and clarifying how they relate to the other key crime prevention activities of Intervention and Implementation.

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